

# GIFT: A Small Present

## Towards Reaching the Limit of Lightweight Encryption

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CHES2017

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## 10 Years Ago...

A decade ago, a lightweight block cipher, PRESENT, was presented at CHES2007.

31-round SPN block cipher with 64-bit block size.  
Very simple design of Sbox layer and bit permutation  
(cost 0GE in hardware).

In 2012, selected as ISO standards, ISO/IEC 29192.

# Block Cipher PRESENT

Its **resistance against differential cryptanalysis (DC)** comes from its Sbox which has differential branching number 3.

Differential branching number  $x$  ( $BN_x$ ): Total Hamming weight of any nonzero input and output differences is at least  $x$ .

Figure: Hamming wt2 Example.





Figure: Hamming wt3 Example.



## Block Cipher PRESENT

However, **BN3 Sboxes are costly in general.**

PRESENT Sbox (BN3) costs 21.33GE, while  
SKINNY Sbox (BN2) costs 13.33GE.

This difference is multiplied in round based implementation.

Also, it is **weaker against linear cryptanalysis (LC).**

## Now...

In CHES2017, we present a new lightweight block cipher, improving over PRESENT, we called it — GIFT.

By carefully crafting the bit permutation in conjunction with the Sbox properties, we can remove the constraint of BN3.

Advantages of GIFT compared to PRESENT:

- **smaller area** thanks to smaller Sbox and also lesser subkey additions,
- **better resistance against LC** thanks to good choice of Sbox and bit permutation,
- lesser rounds and **higher throughput**,
- simpler and **faster key schedule**.

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# Block Cipher GIFT

There are 2 versions of GIFT:


- GIFT-64, 28-round with 64-bit block size,
- GIFT-128, 40-round with 128-bit block size.

Both versions have 128-bit key size.

# Round Function

Each round of GIFT consists of 3 steps:

SubCells, PermBits and AddRoundKey.




Denote rightmost bit as LSB  $b_0$  and  $\{b_{4i+j}\}$  as bit  $j$ .  
 E.g.  $b_1, b_5, b_9, \dots$  are bit 1.

# SubCells

Apply 16 4-bit Sboxes, *GS*, in parallel to every nibble of the state.


Table: GIFT Sbox *GS*

<i>x</i>	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f
<i>GS(x)</i>	1	a	4	c	6	f	3	9	2	d	b	7	5	0	8	e



# PermBits

Pure bit permutation without any XOR gate.




Map bit  $j$  to bit  $j$ .

# AddRoundKey

Add 32-bit round key  $RK$  to the state,


$$RK = U \parallel V = u_{15} \dots u_0 \parallel v_{15} \dots v_0.$$

$U$  and  $V$  are XORed to bit 1 and bit 0 respectively.



# AddRoundKey

Add a single bit '1' is to the most significant bit, and a 6-bit round constant  $C = c_5 c_4 c_3 c_2 c_1 c_0$  is XORed to bit 3 of the first 6 nibbles.



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
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## Round Key


The 128-bit key is split into 8 16-bit words.

$K = k_7 \| k_6 \| \dots \| k_1 \| k_0$ , where  $k_i$  is 16-bit words.

$k_1$  and  $k_0$  are extracted as the round key  $RK = U \| V$ .



Key state is **updated after** key extraction.




where  $\gg i$  is an  $i$  bits right rotation within a 16-bit word.



## Round Constants

Round constants are generated using a 6-bit affine LFSR with 1 XNOR gate (same as SKINNY's).



Initialised to zero, and **updated before** using as round constants.

Rounds	Constants
<b>1 - 16</b>	01, 03, 07, 0F, 1F, 3E, 3D, 3B, 37, 2F, 1E, 3C, 39, 33, 27, 0E
<b>17 - 32</b>	1D, 3A, 35, 2B, 16, 2C, 18, 30, 21, 02, 05, 0B, 17, 2E, 1C, 38
<b>33 - 48</b>	31, 23, 06, 0D, 1B, 36, 2D, 1A, 34, 29, 12, 24, 08, 11, 22, 04


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
# PRESENT Bit Permutation

To understand why BN2 Sboxes do not work for PRESENT, we have to look into the PRESENT bit permutation.

PRESENT bit permutation can be partitioned into 4 independent 16-bit permutations.



## Group Mapping



A group mapping sends the 16 output bits of the **Quotient group** to the input of the **Remainder group**.

$$Q0 = \{S_0, S_1, S_2, S_3\} \rightarrow R0 = \{S_0, S_4, S_8, S_{12}\}.$$

$$Q1 = \{S_4, S_5, S_6, S_7\} \rightarrow R1 = \{S_1, S_5, S_9, S_{13}\}.$$

$$Q2 = \{S_8, S_9, S_{10}, S_{11}\} \rightarrow R2 = \{S_2, S_6, S_{10}, S_{14}\}.$$

$$Q3 = \{S_{12}, S_{13}, S_{14}, S_{15}\} \rightarrow R3 = \{S_3, S_7, S_{11}, S_{15}\}.$$

The group mappings are identical.


## PRESENT Group Mapping

$$Q0 = \{S_0, S_1, S_2, S_3\} \rightarrow R0 = \{S_0, S_4, S_8, S_{12}\}.$$

Table: PRESENT group mapping.

$Q0 \backslash R0$	$S_0$	$S_4$	$S_8$	$S_{12}$
$S_0$	(0, 0)	(1, 0)	(2, 0)	(3, 0)
$S_1$	(0, 1)	(1, 1)	(2, 1)	(3, 1)
$S_2$	(0, 2)	(1, 2)	(2, 2)	(3, 2)
$S_3$	(0, 3)	(1, 3)	(2, 3)	(3, 3)

( $i, j$ ) means output bit  $i$  goes to input bit  $j$



E.g. The  $b_1$  is bit 1 of  $S_0$ , it is mapped to bit 0 of  $S_4$ ,  $b_{16}$ . Hence  $P(1) = 16$ .

# 1 – 1 bit DDT


1 – 1 bit DDT as a sub-table of the DDT containing Hamming weight 1 differences.

Table: 1 – 1 bit DDT Example

$\Delta x \backslash \Delta y$	1000	0100	0010	0001
bit 3 = 1000	0	2	4	0
bit 2 = 0100	0	0	0	0
bit 1 = 0010	0	0	0	0
bit 0 = 0001	0	2	2	0

An Sbox has BN3 if and only if its 1 – 1 bit DDT is all zeroes.


# BN2 Sbox in PRESENT



$Q0 \backslash R0$	$S_0$	$S_4$	$S_8$	$S_{12}$
$S_0$	(0, 0)	(1, 0)	(2, 0)	(3, 0)
$S_1$	(0, 1)	(1, 1)	(2, 1)	(3, 1)
$S_2$	(0, 2)	(1, 2)	(2, 2)	(3, 2)
$S_3$	(0, 3)	(1, 3)	(2, 3)	(3, 3)

$\Delta x \backslash \Delta y$	bit 3	bit 2	bit 1	bit 0
bit 3	0	2	4	0
bit 2	0	0	0	0
bit 1	0	0	0	0
bit 0	0	2	2	0

## BN2 Sbox in PRESENT



5 active Sboxes in 5 rounds (BN2 Sbox) vs  
10 active Sboxes in 5 rounds (original).

PRESENT bit permutation is **not compatible with Sboxes with BN2.**



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## Bad Output must go to Good Input (BOGI)

Table: 1 – 1 bit DDT Example


$\Delta x \backslash \Delta y$	bit 3	bit 2	bit 1	bit 0
bit 3	0	2	4	0
bit 2	0	0	0	0
bit 1	0	0	0	0
bit 0	0	2	2	0

Let  $GI$ ,  $GO$ ,  $BI$ ,  $BO$  denote the set of good inputs, good outputs, bad inputs and bad outputs respectively.

$$GI = \{\text{bit 2, bit 1}\}, \quad GO = \{\text{bit 3, bit 0}\},$$

$$BI = \{\text{bit 3, bit 0}\}, \quad BO = \{\text{bit 2, bit 1}\}.$$

## Core Idea



Observation:

If a single active bit transition occurs, the input and output active bit **must be in  $BI$  and  $BO$** .

Core idea:

We send the bit from  $BO$  to  $GI$  so that **single bit transition does not happen continuously**.

Same for backward direction.

Both  $\Delta_I$  and  $\Delta_O$  have at least 2 active bits.

$\geq 7$  active Sboxes in 5 rounds!

## BOGI Permutation

Let  $\pi_1 : BO \rightarrow GI$  and  $\pi_2 : GO \rightarrow (\pi_1(BO))^c$ .

BOGI permutation  $\pi$  is the union of  $\pi_1$  and  $\pi_2$ .

$$GI = \{\text{bit 2, bit 1}\}, GO = \{\text{bit 3, bit 0}\},$$

$$BI = \{\text{bit 3, bit 0}\}, BO = \{\text{bit 2, bit 1}\}.$$

For this example,  $\pi$  can be an identity mapping.

i.e.  $\pi : \text{bit } j \mapsto \text{bit } j$ .

Necessary and sufficient condition:

$$|BO| \leq |GI| \implies |GI| + |GO| \geq 4$$

Denote  $|GI| + |GO|$  the score of an Sbox.


This can be extended to the 1 – 1 bit LAT and linear cryptanalysis, which is the Achilles' heel of PRESENT.

## GIFT-64 Group Mapping

New bit permutation based on **BOGI group mapping**.

Table: GIFT-64 group mapping

$Q0 \backslash R0$	$GS_0$	$GS_4$	$GS_8$	$GS_{12}$
$GS_0$	(0, 0)	(1, 1)	(2, 2)	(3, 3)
$GS_1$	(1, 1)	(2, 2)	(3, 3)	(0, 0)
$GS_2$	(2, 2)	(3, 3)	(0, 0)	(1, 1)
$GS_3$	(3, 3)	(0, 0)	(1, 1)	(2, 2)



Select an Sbox with **score 4** and has **BOGI identity permutation**.

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## GIFT Sbox Criteria

GIFT Sbox criteria:

- 1 Significantly lighter than PRESENT Sbox.
- 2 At least score 4 for both differential and linear cases.
- 3 There exists BOGI identity permutation for both differential and linear cases.
- 4 For  $\Delta_I, \Delta_O$  s.t.  $p(\Delta_I \rightarrow \Delta_O) > 2^{-2}$ ,  $wt(\Delta_I) + wt(\Delta_O) \geq 4$ .

The last criterion ensures that when sub-optimal differential transition occurs, there is at least a total of 4 active Sboxes in the previous and next round.

## GIFT Sbox

Our GIFT Sbox  $GS$  has:

- cost of 16GE, lighter than PRESENT Sbox (21.33GE),
- maximal differential probability of  $2^{-1.415}$ ,
  - only 2 transitions with probability  $2^{-1.415}$ ,
  - sum of Hamming weight of input and output differences is 4.
- maximal absolute linear bias of  $2^{-2}$ ,
- algebraic degree 3,
- no fixed point.



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## Differential and Linear Bounds

Table: Lower bounds for number of active Sboxes.

Cipher	DC/LC	Rounds								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
GIFT-64	DC	1	2	3	5	7	10	13	16	18
	LC	1	2	3	5	7	9	12	15	18
PRESENT	DC	1	2	4	6	10	12	14	16	18
	LC	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
GIFT-128	DC	1	2	3	5	7	10	13	17	19
	LC	1	2	3	5	7	9	12	14	18

GIFT matches the differential bound of PRESENT— an average of 2 active Sboxes per round.

In addition, GIFT achieved the **same ratio for linear bound at 9-round where PRESENT could not.**

# Differential and Linear Probabilities

Table: 9-round Differential/Linear Probabilities

Cipher	No. of Rounds	Differential Probability	Linear Hull Effect	Est. Rounds Needed
GIFT-64	28	$2^{44.415}$	$2^{49.997}$	14
PRESENT	31	$2^{40.702}$	$2^{27.186}$	22
GIFT-128	40	$2^{46.99}$	$2^{45.99}$	27

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## Round-based Implementation

Comparison of performance metrics for round based implementations synthesized with STM 90nm Standard cell library.

Cipher	Area (GE)	Delay (ns)	Cycles	TP <sub>MAX</sub> (MBit/s)	Power ( $\mu$ W) (@10MHz)	Energy (pJ)
GIFT-64-128	1345	1.83	29	1249.0	74.8	216.9
SKINNY-64-128	1477	1.84	37	966.2	80.3	297.0
PRESENT 64/128	1560	1.63	33	1227.0	71.1	234.6
SIMON 64/128	1458	1.83	45	794.8	72.7	327.3
GIFT-128-128	1997	1.85	41	1729.7	116.6	478.1
SKINNY-128-128	2104	1.85	41	1729.7	132.5	543.3
SIMON 128/128	2064	1.87	69	1006.6	105.6	728.6
AES 128	7215	3.83	11	3038.2	730.3	803.3

## Bit-slice Implementation

Bitslice software implementations of GIFT and other lightweight block ciphers. Performances are given in cycles per byte, with messages composed of 2000 64-bit blocks to obtain the results.

<b>Cipher</b>	<b>Speed (c/B)</b>	<b>Cipher</b>	<b>Speed (c/B)</b>
GIFT-64-128	2.10	GIFT-128-128	2.57
SKINNY-64-128	2.88	SKINNY-128-128	4.70
SIMON-64-128	1.74	SIMON-128-128	2.55

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## Conclusion

- Propose new lightweight block cipher with 2 block sizes, GIFT-64 and GIFT-128.
- Improvement of PRESENT:
  - remove Sbox constraint of BN3,
  - use lighter Sbox than PRESENT Sbox,
  - prevent the LC weakness in PRESENT,
  - improve performances,
  - extend to 128-bit block size.
- Strong against classical DC/LC and other cryptanalysis.
- Better performances than existing lightweight block ciphers: area, throughput, energy.



Thank you. :)